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There is empirical evidence that emotion can enhance long-
term memory under certain conditions and impair or distort it
under others (for review, see Bradley, 1994; Christianson, 1992).
Free recall of words or images tends to be easier if they have
negative or sometimes positive emotional content than if they are
emotionally neutral (e.g., Bradley & Baddeley, 1990; Bradley,
Greenwald, Petry, & Lang, 1992; Doerksen & Shimanura, 2001).
Similarly, studies of autobiographical memories have often
revealed a memory-enhancing effect of emotion, reporting that
emotionally relevant personal experiences are easier to recall than
experiences without emotional import (e.g., Conway, 1995;
Thompson, Skowronski, Larsen, & Betz, 1996). In the case of
recognition memory, however, experimental results have not been
so consistent: some authors, such as Ochsner (2000), have
reported better recognition of images with emotional content than
of those without, while others, such as Maratos, Allen, & Rugg
(2000), have observed the reverse. This issue has considerable
practical implications: for example, it has been reported that
eyewitnesses to emotive events tend to exhibit uncritical
acceptance of assertions that are compatible with what they have
seen but are in fact false (García-Bajos & Migueles, 1999;
Migueles & García-Bajos, 1999). 
Most research on recognition of emotive stimuli has focused on
the accuracy or discrimination of recognition, but the influence of
emotion on the individual’s general tendency to deem that
recognition has occurred (bias) is also of interest. There is
evidence that emotion may increase the likelihood that a
participant will indicate that he or she recognizes a stimulus as
indicated by the fact that the percentages of true and false positives
in word recognition are both being larger for words with emotive
content than for those without. In particular, it has been reported
that participants are considerably more likely to claim recognition
of words inducing negative emotions than of emotionally neutral
words (e.g., Maratos et al., 2000; Windmann & Kruger, 1998;
Windmann & Kutas, 2001). One hypothesis put forward to explain
this relative bias is that negative emotionality defines a coherent
semantic category, whereas emotionally neutral words are not
interrelated in this way (Maratos et al., 2000). Based on this
hypothesis, false recognition of negative emotional words could be
due to the same cognitive processes as give rise to false
recognition of neutral words that are semantically related to words
that have genuinely been seen before (Roediger & Gallo, 2004;
Roediger & McDermott, 1995). By contrast, Windmann & Kutas
(2001) have suggested that it is the emotional response to
negatively emotive stimuli, rather than their semantic properties,
that is responsible for recognition bias, at least in the case of
negatively emotive words. They also claimed that this relaxation
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of the participant’s internal criterion of recognition fulfils the
potentially useful function of preventing stimuli inducing negative
emotions from going unheeded. 
To decide between the above two hypotheses, McNeely, Dywan,
& Segalowitz (2004) recently carried out recognition experiments
using three word groups: emotionally neutral words, negatively
emotive words, and animal names. The latter group was regarded
as emotionally neutral but more semantically homogeneous than
the other two. Their results led them to conclude that it is the
emotional response to negatively emotive words, rather than their
possible semantic coherence, that is responsible for their greater
probability of false recognition. The results of recent recognition
experiments in which face pictures were used instead of words have
also been interpreted as weighing against the semantic coherence
theory (Johansson, Mecklinger, & Treese, 2004).
In the studies mentioned above, stimuli were distinguished on
the basis of their emotional valence, that is, as to whether they
aroused pleasant emotions, or unpleasant emotions, or were
emotionally neutral. They were, however, not distinguished with
regard to the intensity of the emotion induced, that is, the degree of
arousal. Nevertheless, emotional arousal has been reported to affect
familiarity-based (rapid-response) recognition independently of
valence (Dougal, 2003), and experiments in which liberal
recognition bias was induced by positively and negatively valent
stimuli but not by neutral stimuli also suggest an effect of arousal
rather than valence itself (Johansson, Mecklinger, & Treese, 2004).
To better understand the influence of emotion on memory, it
seems necessary to make some minimal assumptions as to the
basic organization or structure of emotion. In this sense, an
approach widely accepted view emotion as a phenomenon that can
be described by its coordinates in a two-dimensional space, the
basic dimensions being identified as valence, which ranges from
unpleasant (negative) to pleasant (positive), and arousal, which
ranges from calm to excited (Bradley, 1994; Kensinger, 2004).
Accordingly, both dimensions need to be considered in order to
assess effects of emotion on memory in general, including
autobiographical memory. Thus, for example, it was found that
autobiographical memories are organized in terms of emotional
valence, but not arousal (Schulkind & Woldorf, 2005). 
We report here the results of a study of the influence of both the
valence and arousal dimensions of emotionality on pictorial material
recognition in a long-term memory task. To situate stimuli in two-
dimensional affective space we used the International Affective
Picture System (IAPS, CSEA-NIMH, 1999; Lang, Bradley, &
Cuthbert, 1999), a standard set of colour pictures with contents
eliciting a wide range of emotions. The validity and reliability of the
IAPS have been thoroughly verified, and normative values have been
obtained in a number of different countries, including Spain. We
focused our attention primarily on bias effects, for sensitive evaluation
of which we employed a signal detection theory (SDT) approach.
Method
Participants
Of the 220 first-year psychology students who took part in the
study as a class requirement, 27 failed to comply with instructions
regarding the correct interpretation of the valence and arousal
dimensions in the evaluation phase. Thus the definitive sample
comprised 193 individuals (56 men, 137 women). 
Overall study design
The study comprised three phases: training, rating, and
recognition. In the first, the participants were trained in rating
IAPS pictures for valence and arousal. In the second, they were
asked to rate IAPS pictures they had not seen previously. Two
months later, in the third phase, they were shown a sequence of
rating-phase pictures mixed with previously unseen IAPS pictures
(«new» pictures), and were asked to rate their confidence as to
whether they had seen these pictures previously. A multi-point
rating scale was used (rather than a yes/no question) so as to be
able to construct a reasonably complete memory operating
characteristic (MOC) for SDT analysis (Snodgrass, Levy-Berger,
& Haydon, 1985). Training took place in a room adjoining the
laboratory in which rating and recognition were performed. The
same researcher was at hand in all three phases to resolve queries. 
It was used a 2 × 2 within-subjects design, with Picture Exposure
Status (old, new) as the first factor, and Arousal (unarousing,
arousing) or Valence (unpleasant, pleasant) as the second factor. 
Materials
On the basis of their normative valence and arousal ratings in
the Spanish population (Molto et al., 1999), three sets of IAPS
pictures were chosen: 6 for the training phase, 36 for the rating
phase, and 72 new pictures for the recognition phase. Each set was
representative of all areas of affective space. Care was taken that
the pictures in each set would not resemble any pictures in the
other two sets sufficiently closely. This was done to avoid high
levels of false recognition. Similarly, whenever possible, the
stimulus sets were matched for semantic content. Thus, if a picture
of a gun was placed in a set, a picture of a different gun was placed
in the other sets, in order to thus maintain equivalent levels of
valence and arousal in each stimulus set. The same procedure has
been followed therefore that in other studies that examined effects
of emotion in recognition memory and that used IAPS pictures as
stimulus material (e.g., Bradley et al., 1992; Ochsner, 2000). As
Ochsner (2000) notes, matching for content «was also thought to
be desirable to ensure that memory for photos would not be at
ceiling, which was a concern given that recognition memory for
pictures can be quite robust even after long delays» (p. 246). 
For evaluation of IAPS pictures in terms of valence and arousal
in the training and rating phases of the study, we used a paper-and-
pencil version of the Self-Assessment Manikin scale (SAM; Lang,
1980). This scale allows IAPS pictures to be rated from 1 (low) to
9 (high) for both valence and arousal (for a detailed description of
the SAM scale, see Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993). 
Procedure
Preliminary training phase. After the use of SAM had been
individually explained to the participants, they practised by rating
the 6 IAPS pictures chosen for this phase, after which any
remaining queries they had on how to rate these pictures with
SAM were answered by the researcher. This phase served not only
to train participants formally in the use of SAM, but also for them
to establish points of reference for subsequent picture evaluation
in the rating phase.
Rating phase. Each subject was seated in a soundproof
experimental booth facing a computer monitor screen. On the
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screen, participants could initially read that the experiment formed
part of a study on the emotive content of images, and that during
the session they would have to use SAM to rate a series of pictures
for valence and arousal. At no point were participants informed
that there would be a subsequent phase in which they would be
asked to recognize pictures. The 36 rating phase IAPS pictures
were presented individually on the screen in random order. In each
case, display of the picture itself for 6 seconds was preceded by a
five-second display of a text asking the subject to prepare to rate
the next picture, and was followed by display of a text asking for
the picture to be rated for valence and for arousal. The time
allowed for rating each picture was 20 seconds.
Recognition phase. Two months after the rating phase,
participants returned to the same booth as previously. The text
initially shown on the monitor screen informed them that they
would be presented with a series of pictures, some of which they
had seen in the rating phase. For each picture they were asked to use
the recognition rating form to rate the confidence with which they
could assert having seen it before. The six-point rating scale used
was: --- (certainly hadn’t), -- (probably hadn’t), - (more probably
hadn’t than had), + (more probably had than hadn’t), ++ (probably
had), +++ (certainly had). The 36 rating phase IAPS pictures («old»
pictures) and 72 new recognition phase IAPS pictures were then
presented in random order except that the presentation of more than
two old pictures in a row was prevented. The 72 new recognition
phase pictures had been chosen following termination of the rating
phase. For each rating phase picture, two pictures were chosen that
a) did not resemble any pictures used in the previous phases
sufficiently closely for there to be an obvious risk of mistaken
recognition, and b) had normative valence and arousal values that
were no more than 1 unit from the corresponding average ratings
awarded by participants to the rating phase picture.
Results
The valence and arousal ratings given to the IAPS pictures used
in the rating phase exhibited distributions with the same typical
boomerang shape as has been observed in other studies (e.g.,
Bradley, Cuthbert, & Lang, 1996). 
Table 1 lists the aggregate recognition phase results for new
and old pictures. Use of the trapezoid rule to approximate the area
under the corresponding 5-point memory operating characteristic
(MOC, Snodgrass, Levy-Berger, & Haydon, 1985) affords a value
of 0.76. This value means that the subjects exhibited a recognition
ability greater than the value 0.5 corresponding to random
recognition decisions. 
We performed ANOVAs on the reduced data set obtained when
+, ++ and +++ ratings were all treated as a «Yes» response and -,
-- and --- ratings were all treated as a «No» response. To determine
whether true and/or false recognition claims were influenced by
picture valence or arousal, the old and new picture groups were
each split into subgroups separated by the median normative
valence or arousal rating of that group (median valence was 5.37
for old pictures and 5.45 for new pictures, and median arousal 5.61
for old pictures and 5.69 for new pictures). For old pictures, the
mean valences of the high and low arousal picture groups were
4.55 (SD= 1.47) and 4.16 (SD= 1.22), respectively, and the mean
arousal values of the high and low valence groups were 6.56 (SD=
0.55) and 6.13 (SD= 1.14), respectively. For new pictures, the
mean valences of the high and low arousal picture groups were
4.43 (SD= 2.23) and 4.27 (SD= 0.62), respectively, and the mean
arousal values of the high and low valence groups were 6.71 (SD=
1.05) and 5.96 (SD= 1.75), respectively. The t tests showed that
the two valence groups are matched for arousal [t(17)= .78, p>.05,
for old pictures and t (35)= .48, p>.05, for new pictures] and the
arousal groups matched for valence [t (17) = 1.70, p>.05, for old
pictures and t (35) = 1.99, p>.05, for new pictures]. Table 2 lists
the sample means and standard deviations of the proportions of
true and false recognition claims made by each subject for each of
these picture groups. These data were analysed by 2 × 2 repeated
measures ANOVAs, with Picture Exposure Status (old, new) and
Arousal (unarousing, arousing) as the within group factors and
levels in one case, and Picture Exposure Status and Valence
(unpleasant, pleasant) in the other. 
The Picture Exposure Status versus Arousal ANOVA on the
proportions of recognition claims detected a significant effect of
Arousal, F(1, 192)= 53.20, p<.01, as well as the expected effect
of Picture Exposure Status, F(1, 192)= 1540.58, p<.01. There was
also an interaction between both variables, F(1, 192)= 6.53,
p<.01), showing that the proportion of pictures eliciting
recognition claims was significantly greater for arousing than for
unarousing pictures both when these claims were true, t(192)=
2.48, p<.01, and, even more markedly, when they were false,
t(192)= 9.16, p<.01. The Picture Exposure Status versus Valence
ANOVA detected significant effects of both Picture Exposure
Status, F(1, 192)= 1540.58, p<.01, and Valence, F(1, 192)= 4.91,
p<.05, and again there was significant modulation of one effect by
the other, F(1, 192)= 10.51, p<.01. The latter effect showed that
unpleasant pictures elicited significantly more false recognition
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Table 1
Pooled picture recognition confidence data
Exposure Recognition confidence rating
status --- -- - + ++ +++
Frequency matrix
OLD 0546 0756 0618 1183 1714 2131
NEW 5276 3795 1997 1449 1015 0364
Cumulated probability matrix
OLD 1 .92 .81 .72 .55 .31
NEW 1 .62 .35 .20 .10 .03
Uncumulated probability matrix
OLD .08 .11 .09 .17 .24 .31
NEW .38 .27 .15 .10 .07 .03
Mean recognition proportions (A’)
.84 .83 .80
Table 2
Proportions of «yes» (+, ++ or +++) responses in picture subgroups defined
by Exposure status (old or new) and Valence or Arousal level. Data are means
and standard deviations (in parentheses) of the proportions observed for each
subject
Exposure Valence Arousal
status Unpleasant Pleasant Unarousing Arousing
OLD .72 (.17) .73 (.17) .71 (.18) .74 (.17)
NEW .22 (.12) .19 (.13) .17 (.13) .24 (.13)
claims than pleasant pictures, t(192)= 5.65, p<.01, but there was
no such difference for true claims, t(192)= .67, p>.05. 
The fact that for both old and new pictures the probability of a
recognition claim was greater for arousing than unarousing
pictures shows primarily that arousal introduced liberal bias into
recognition judgements. However, the fact that the increase in the
probability of false recognition associated with unpleasantness
was not accompanied by a significant increase in the probability of
true recognition suggests primarily that unpleasantness may have
reduced discrimination between old and new pictures. 
To assess the influence of both emotion dimensions (arousal
and valence) on recognition memory performance a signal-
detection approach was used.1 More specifically, we analysed
discrimination and response bias measures based on a non-
parametric model (A’ and B”D, respectively; Donaldson, 1992;
Snodgrass, Levy-Berger, & Haydon, 1985). Values of A’ can vary
between 0 and 1: higher values indicate greater discrimination and
.5 indicates chance performance. Values of B”D can vary between
-1 and +1: negative values indicate liberal bias, positive values
indicate conservative bias, and 0 indicates neutral bias.
Table 3 lists the pooled values of A’ and B”D at each confidence
level of «yes» responses, for emotional valence and arousal. The
values of A’ reflect considerable discrimination between old and
new pictures in both arousal and valence levels. With regard to the
valence dimension, discrimination was significantly higher for
pleasant pictures than for unpleasant ones, t(192)= 2.32, p<.05,
while in terms of arousal, discrimination was greater for
unarousing pictures than for arousing ones, t(192)= 2.22, p<.05.
Looking next at response bias values, with regard to the valence
dimension the unpleasantness introduced a significantly less
conservative bias than the pleasantness in all confidence levels. On
the other hand, with regard to arousal, when the participants
indicated high confidence (+++) in recognition, no differences
were found between arousing and unarousing pictures, t(192)=
0,91, p>.05. However, when the participants showed the lowest
confidence (+) in their recognition judgements, a significantly
lower bias was obtained for arousing pictures than for unarousing
ones, t(192)= 6,65, p<.01. Similarly, when the participants used
an intermediate criterion (++) between the two aforementioned
ones, the bias for high-arousal pictures was lower than for the low-
arousal ones, t(192)= 5,00, p<.01. 
Discussion
When the old and new pictures were divided in high- and low-
arousal subgroups, ANOVA suggested that, relative to unarousing
pictures, arousing pictures were judged with a liberal recognition
bias: for both old and new pictures, recognition claims were more
probable for an arousing than for an unarousing picture. This
finding was confirmed by the signal detection analysis (Table 3).
However, this latter analysis furthermore shows that the relative
liberal bias applied to arousing pictures was in fact due to
unarousing pictures being judged with conservative absolute bias
(as measured by B”D), the absolute bias applied to arousing
pictures being almost zero (B”D= .03) when the participants
showed the lowest confidence (+) in their recognition judgements.
It is true that a conservative bias was to be expected, due to there
having been twice as many new pictures as old pictures in the
recognition phase of the study. However we consider the fact that
the low arousal pictures are associated with a relatively high bias to
be a relevant result. It is noteworthy taking into account the lack of
bias in arousing pictures when a gross decision («+» in confidence
scale) between recognition and non- recognition was required.
When the old and new pictures were divided in pleasant and
unpleasant subgroups, ANOVA suggested that among new pictures
unpleasantness might increase the probability of recognition
claims. But the fact that there was no parallel for this result among
old pictures seemed to point to a reduction in discrimination
between old and new pictures that are associated with
unpleasantness. This result was confirmed by the corresponding
signal detection analysis with the index A’. The signal detection
analysis also revealed a conservative bias in all confidence levels,
and this was always lower for unpleasant pictures. 
It should be mentioned that there is little empirical evidence
related to signal detection analysis regarding recognition memory
for emotional stimuli. Bearing this in mind, when words are used as
emotional stimuli, the recognition accuracy results are inconclusive
(see Johansson et al., 2004). The same is true when pictures are
used as emotional stimuli. Thus neither Bradley et al. (1992) nor
Johansson et al. (2004) found any significant differences regarding
discrimination between pleasant and unpleasant pictures. However,
Ochsner (2000) found greater accuracy for unpleasant pictures than
for pleasant ones. Finally, the results from our study contradict
those of Ochsner, as they show greater discrimination for pleasant
pictures that for unpleasant ones. There is a similar disparity in the
results concerning arousal. Thus, Bradley et al. (1992) found better
recognition memory performance for arousing pictures as opposed
to unarousing ones, while Ochsner (2000) found greater accuracy
for medium-arousal pictures as opposed to high- or low-arousal
ones. However, our results show greater accuracy for unarousing
pictures than for arousing ones. Cross (1999) obtained similar
results, though words were employed as stimuli.
Regarding the bias, although they used words as emotional
stimuli, Windman & Kutas (2001) obtained a more liberal bias for
negative words than for neutral ones. Using IAPS pictures as
stimuli, Ochsner (2000, Experiment 1) found a more liberal bias
for negative pictures than for positive ones. This last result is
similar to that obtained in the present study, in which a more
liberal bias was obtained for unpleasant pictures than for pleasant
ones in all confidence levels. As regards the arousal dimension, in
the three experiments reported by Oshner (2000), a more liberal
bias was found for the high-arousing pictures that for low-arousing
ones. This finding is also consistent with that obtained in our
research, in which the bias for arousing pictures was more liberal
than for unarousing pictures, at least in the lowest confidence
levels. Consequently, our bias data, unlike the accuracy data, are in
line with the scant empirical evidence that is available. 
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Table 3
Mean B”D values at each confidence level of «yes» responses and pooled values
(+, ++, +++) for A’ in valence and arousal dimensions
B”D + B”D ++ B”D +++ A’
Valence Pleasant .18 (.53) .74 (.31) .97 (.08) .85 (.09)
Unpleasant .10 (.50) .65 (.34) .95 (.12) .83 (.09)
Arousal Arousing .03 (.51) .65 (.33) .96 (.08) .83 (.09)
Unarousing .26 (.54) .74 (.33) .96 (.11) .85 (.09)
Standard deviation are given in the parenthesis
In general, our data show that greater discrimination is
accompanied by a more conservative response bias for pleasant
and for unarousing pictures than for unpleasant and for arousing
ones. Thus, these results preclude the conclusion that «memory for
the occurrence of an emotional stimulus associated with high
arousal is better than for a stimulus rated low in arousal, regardless
of its pleasantness» (Bradley et al., 1992, p. 388). Moreover, these
results suggest that the response bias may be influenced by
emotional arousal, and not only by emotional valence, resulting in
new evidence in connection with the emotion-induced recognition
bias. More precisely, the contribution of the two-dimesional
approach of emotion lies in signalling the importance of the
arousal dimension as well as that of valence. Even the results of
Johansson et al (2004), using faces as emotional stimuli and taking
into account both dimensions, suggest «that a flexible criterion
setting may occur as a function of emotional arousal rather than of
negative valence» (p. 1848). Lastly, given that in the present study
pictures (and not words) have been employed as stimuli, the
semantic coherence hypothesis may not hold. This same
conclusion was reached by Johansson et al. (2004), who did not
use verbal stimuli in their research, and hence their results are also
difficult to explain in terms of semantic coherence.
In future research it would be of interest, firstly, to continue
using the two-dimensional approach for the study of the emotion-
induced recognition bias. Secondly, it would be convenient to use,
wherever possible, standardized scaled emotional stimuli, such as
those appearing in IAPS or in the ANEW (Affective Norms for
English Words; Bradley & Lang, 1999). This would facilitate the
handling of the location of the stimuli in the affective space, as
well as the replication of the results. A study taking the
aforementioned points into consideration could shed more light on
whether the mechanism underlying the emotion-induced
recognition bias is due to semantic coherence or to emotionality
per se.
1 For recent evidence on the viability of different models of
recognition memory, see, e.g., Malmberg, 2002; Pelegrina &
Tejeiro, 2006; Slotnick & Dodson, 2005; Yonelinas, 1999.
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